Sir, I have read with great interest your leading article upon "The Science of Everything" in the Supplement for April 23. "It is probable," you say therein, "that in psychology radical new concepts are required." And, in the last paragraph, that "the curiously baffling difficulties that present psychological theories encounter suggest that a genius is required." May I suggest that these desires are met by the two works, Man's Supreme Inheritance and Constructive Conscious Control, of Mr. Matthias Alexander? In his introduction to the second of these, Professor John Dewey says: "As a consequence of sincerity and thoroughness, maintained in spite of great odds, without diversion to side issues of fame and external success, Mr Alexander has demonstrated a new scientific principle with respect to the control of human behaviour, as important as any principle which has ever been discovered in the domain of external nature. Not only this, but his discovery is necessary to complete the discoveries that have been made about non-human nature, if these discoveries and inventions are not to end by making us their servants and helpless tools."

I would point out that the author of these works is a wholly original thinker and a pre-eminently national one. In face of the urgent problems and needs of to-day, his theory, unlike that of Einstein, is emphatically "a logical necessity." Moreover, if genius be "an infinite capacity for taking pains," then Mr. Alexander is the genius for whom every one is looking.

Alexander's conception of the human organism is that of an indivisible unity. In his Constructive Conscious Control he states: "I use the term psycho-physical activity to indicate all human manifestations, and psycho-physical mechanism to indicate the instrument which makes these manifestations possible." It is in accordance with this conception that he has worked out a technique which is a "constructed work of art" and which he has applied in practice for thirty years to promote the psycho-physical growth and development of the human organism and constructive conscious control of the activities involved. Further, this technique provides for our psycho-physical attitude towards the "familiar" and the "simple," for it is a practical process of "reasoning from the known to the unknown," first in regard to the use of the psycho-physical self, and then in connexion with the use of the self in meeting the demands of everyday life in the ever-changing environment of civilization. This relation to environment demands a technique in which direction and guidance shall be built up consciously and constructively, employing the real central control in human activity. I would emphasize the fact that the central control thus employed is that advocated by Magnus and referred to by Sherrington in his recent address before the Royal Society. That this simple central control should have been discovered and used by Alexander thirty years ago is especially interesting, because it cleared the way for him to the recognition of the "simple elements" and fostered the correct psycho-physical attitude towards the "familiar" and the "unfamiliar." Consequently his books abound with the interpretation of psycho-physical experiences in the unrecognized springs of human conduct: so that, as Dewey has pointed out in the passage already quoted, he has demonstrated a new scientific principle. In accordance with this
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developing the reliability of sensory consciousness and sensory observation, conditions so essential to men of science, and for the psycho-physical interpretation of "form and content" ("the very stuff of our consciousness"). In the matter of relativity it seems to me to satisfy all demands.

In Alexander's technique "means whereby" create their "ends." The use of prevention follows the contention that if something is wrong the "cause" must be prevented as primary principle before any attempt is made to do what is right in the right way, the latter being the familiar primary consideration. In attempts to eradicate shortcomings, the procedure is always on a general and not a specific basis. In other words, the improved working of the whole organism as a unity (general) is the "means-whereby" specific shortcomings are dealt with ­ they are eradicated in the process. As you have, in your leading article, pointed out, "a universal science cannot tolerate a complete separation of matter and mind"; in Alexander's technique we have unity in this connexion, and if Dewey is right in his conclusions the "unity science" to which you point as to needed calls for that "objective personal element" with the individual. To quote Dewey once more, "It is, however, one thing to teach the need of a return to the individual man as the ultimate agency in whatever mankind and society collectively can accomplish, to point out the necessity of straightening out this ultimate condition of whatever humanity in mass can attain. It is another thing to discover the concrete procedure by which this greatest of all tasks can be executed. And this indispensable thing is exactly what Mr Alexander has accomplished." The importance of the subject must plead my apology for the length of this letter.

Faithfully yours,
Macleod Yearsley, F.R.C.S.

81, Wimpole-street, W.1.